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HAITI : international efforts
to restore democracy

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HAITI: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY



Michel Rossignol
Political and Social Affairs Division

September 1994



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HAITI: INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

The crisis in Haiti is the latest obstacle in the country's quest to become a democracy. After decades of dictatorship under the leadership of the notorious Papa Doc Duvalier and, for a brief period, of his son, Haiti was able to undertake the difficult transition from dictatorship to democracy. The country's first free and fair elections were marked by violence and delay, but when they finally took place, in December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president with 67% of the popular vote.

After a few months of democratic rule, however, in September 1991, the military, always a force to be reckoned with in Haiti, staged a bloody military coup which forced Aristide to leave the country. The international community had welcomed Haiti's adoption of democracy and was angered by the coup; it called on the military to restore the democratically elected president. The latest crisis is part of the tug-of-war between Aristide and the international community on one side and the military leaders and their supporters in Haiti on the other which has gone on ever since the coup. This paper analyzes the situation and the risks involved in the military intervention by the United Nations.

THE ROAD TO THE 3 JULY 1993 AGREEMENT

A. Actions Immediately after the Coup

International condemnation of the military regime in the days following the coup was fuelled not only by disgust at its violence and disappointment at seeing hopes for democracy and economic recovery in Haiti so quickly dashed, but also by concern about the effects of the

coup on other young democracies in the hemisphere. In the late 1980s, there had been a definite swing towards democracy in Latin America, with many countries replacing decades-old dictatorships with democratic governments. It was in this atmosphere that Haiti had established its democratic regime.

The coup in Haiti not only went against the prevailing trend in Latin America, but also threatened to encourage military leaders in other young democracies in the region to return to their old ways and overthrow democratically elected governments whenever they disagreed with their policies. The Organization of American States (OAS), where the countries in the Americas, including Canada since 1989, are represented, had in June 1991 adopted Resolution 1080, which stated that action would be taken if the democratically elected government of an OAS country was illegally overthrown.

The OAS was quick to condemn the coup in Haiti and held an emergency Foreign Ministers' meeting on 2 October 1991. Subsequently, a group of OAS foreign ministers and diplomats went to hold discussions with the military leaders in Haiti, but it was forced to leave the island. On 8 October, the OAS voted to impose sanctions on Haiti and thereby to put pressure on the military leaders. The sanctions limited the flow of goods to Haiti, except for humanitarian aid.

As a member of the OAS, Canada joined other members of the organization in condemning the coup and in imposing sanctions. Prime Minister Mulroney had reacted angrily to the news of the coup and called on the military leaders to restore democracy, raising the possibility of military action if this did not happen. Canada was concerned with the situation in Haiti for a number of reasons, such as our traditional links with that country through *la Francophonie*, as well as a vocal community of Canadians of Haitian origin, and our consistent support for the new democracies everywhere.

Canada saw the situation in Haiti as a test for the new world order emerging in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly on 11 October 1991, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall stated this country's position as follows: "Canada considers it the duty of the international community to exercise the necessary moral force and political will to help

restore legitimate government and basic security to the Haitian people."⁽¹⁾ While calling on the international community for action, Canada itself suspended development aid to Haiti shortly after the coup. In November, it imposed sanctions on that country in compliance with the 8 October decision of the OAS, which, among other things, banned bilateral trade.

B. Stalemate in 1992

The tug-of-war between the OAS and the Haitian military leaders continued into 1992. The possibility of armed intervention was mentioned now and then, but the OAS preferred to rely on diplomatic negotiations to restore democracy in Haiti. Although Haiti is a small country with little in terms of military resources, military intervention could still cause considerable bloodshed, especially if the military leaders decided to fight to the death. Furthermore, since the U.S. invasion of Granada and Panama had created considerable controversy within the OAS, the organization was probably determined to avoid a military invasion of Haiti if at all possible.

In February 1992, some progress was made when OAS-sponsored negotiations between President Aristide and leaders of the Haitian Parliament produced an accord that would have allowed Aristide to appoint a prime minister to pave the way for his eventual return to Haiti. The military leaders, however, were simply not interested in transferring power to an interim prime minister and the tug-of-war continued. In light of the military's refusal to cooperate, the OAS decided in May 1992 to tighten the sanctions.

The Canadian government took advantage of the *Special Economic Measures Act* recently adopted by Parliament to impose new sanctions on Haiti. On 5 June, Haitian government assets in Canada were frozen and, on 10 July, regulations were issued to prohibit Haitian ships or any ships violating the embargo from entering Canadian ports. Despite these measures by Canada and measures by other OAS members, questions were raised in the media and elsewhere about the effectiveness of the embargo on Haiti, especially since European countries and even the United States were suspected of ignoring some of the sanctions.

(1) Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade, *Statement*, No. 91/48, 11 October 1991.

C. United Nations Involvement

Doubts about the embargo's effectiveness and the failure to convince Haitian military leaders to restore democracy encouraged Canada and other OAS members to try to get the United Nations directly involved in the Haitian crisis. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, the UN was now playing a more pro-active role in dealing with international troublespots and its involvement would put considerable pressure on the coup leaders. Intervention in disputes within a country, however, still presented a number of problems for the UN.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had been a clear-cut act of aggression by one country against another, and in terms of international law, there are precedents for collective action against such an aggressor. The coup in Haiti, however, is an internal matter for which the rules for international action are not as clear. While some countries favour more direct action by the UN in internal matters, other countries, notably China, are opposed to this. Thus, while deploring the coup in Haiti, the UN did not take any significant measures immediately after.

After lobbying by Canada and other countries, however, the UN began to pay more attention to the Haitian crisis. In November 1992, the General Assembly passed a resolution condemning human rights violations in Haiti and calling on the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures. The UN Security Council, therefore, considered the imposition of sanctions on Haiti to be applied by all UN members, not just OAS members. (According to the UN Charter, all countries must comply with any decision by the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions.) In January 1993, the UN Secretary-General, together with the OAS Secretary-General, also appointed a special representative, Mr. Dante Caputo, to undertake discussions with the coup leaders.

THE 3 JULY 1993 AGREEMENT

A. The Impact of UN Sanctions

While threatening to impose extensive world-wide sanctions, the UN also bolstered diplomatic efforts in the hopes of persuading the coup leaders to restore democracy.

The coup leaders, however, showed no sign of bowing to international pressure and the U.S. and the rest of the international community became more and more impatient.

As a result, the new Clinton Administration launched an initiative in June 1993 by imposing new sanctions on Haiti, including the freezing of the assets in the U.S. of Haitian military leaders and their supporters. The U.S. also joined Canada, France, and Venezuela in asking the Security Council to go ahead with mandatory sanctions. On 16 June, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for mandatory sanctions to be imposed on 23 June if no progress had been made in restoring the legitimate government.

Almost as soon as UN sanctions went into effect, the Haitian military leaders finally gave signs that they were ready to compromise. Guided by Mr. Caputo, the negotiations between Aristide supporters and the military leaders produced an agreement which was signed in the U.S. on 4 July 1993. The so-called Governors Island agreement paved the way for Aristide's return to Haiti on 30 October 1993. As part of the agreement, Aristide established on 31 August a government of national reconciliation with Robert Malval, a Haitian businessman, as prime minister.

B. Establishment of Peacekeeping Force

To assist the restoration of democracy, the UN and the OAS called in late August for all sanctions on Haiti to be lifted. This was done partly as a goodwill gesture towards the military leaders, whose cooperation was needed to implement the agreement, but also partly to stop the damage being inflicted on the Haitian economy. Canada complied on 27 August. The UN also undertook to establish a multinational force that would include military engineers to rebuild public buildings and hospitals and a civilian police force to train and monitor the work of the Haitian police.

On 23 September 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 867, to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). (Although not a peacekeeping force in the traditional sense, where UN soldiers monitor a ceasefire between two opposing sides, UNMIH members are commonly called peacekeepers and the term will be used in this paper.) Canada announced on 6 October that some 110 Canadian Forces personnel, mostly construction engineers, and about 100 RCMP officers would participate in UNMIH.

The Governors Island agreement was seen as a great victory for, among other things, sanctions.⁽²⁾ In the euphoria which followed the signing of the agreement and the swearing-in of the government of national reconciliation in late August, the consensus among many journalists and diplomats was that the threat of UN sanctions on top of existing OAS and U.S. sanctions had finally persuaded the Haitian military and its supporters, mainly within the Haitian business community, to let the democratically elected president resume his duties. There was little doubt that Haiti's economy had suffered because of the sanctions and that the Haitian business community therefore feared the effects of additional sanctions.

C. Continued Opposition to Aristide

Many members of the business community and a number of military leaders, apparently because of involvement with narcotic smuggling rings, are independently wealthy and can resist the effects of sanctions for a long time. As in most cases where they are used, sanctions have had a significant impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, already very poor, but have not necessarily hurt the people in power they are intended to persuade. Though fearful of the effects of new sanctions, many military and business leaders, united by a common dislike of Aristide, were reluctant to comply with the *Governors Island agreement*.

Indeed, ever since the fall of the Duvalier regime, Haiti has been marked by the struggle for power between those who favour socialist policies aimed at improving the lot of the masses and those who champion a more right-wing approach. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a priest who favoured liberation theology, is very popular among the ordinary citizens of the island, but many of the military and business leaders, especially those who had supported the Duvalier regime, find him too left-wing and fear that he will force them to abandon many of their privileges. These fears had driven the military to stage the coup in the first place, so despite international pressure, they were not likely to like Aristide any better in 1993.

(2) See for example "Sanctions Work," *The Economist*, 4 September 1993, p. 41-42.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE 3 JULY 1993 AGREEMENT

A. The Deteriorating Situation in Haiti

Given Haiti's tumultuous past, it should perhaps have been recognized earlier that the military might not honour its commitments under the Governors Island agreement. However, since the implementation of the agreement and the avoidance of bloodshed depended on the cooperation of the military leaders, little could be done, apart from warning that sanctions might be reimposed, to hold them to their promises. Unfortunately, the threat of new sanctions was not enough to make the military leaders keep their word.

In fact, in September, once it became clear that the military and its supporters were murdering his supporters in Haiti in increasing numbers, Aristide started asking the UN to reimpose sanctions. Aristide's pleas were not immediately acted upon, probably because the international community had expected some violence to occur and because there were high hopes that the UNMIH peacekeeping force would contain the violence. However, when the contingent of RCMP officers arrived in Haiti, the climate of violence prevented them from undertaking their assigned task. The U.S. Navy transport ship *USS Harlan County*, carrying Canadian and U.S. peacekeepers, was unable to dock on 12 October because of agitation by so-called attachés, supporters and agents of the anti-Aristide military and business leaders. Thus it finally became evident that the Governors Island agreement would not be implemented as planned.

Because of the growing threat of violence, the RCMP contingent was withdrawn from Haiti and most countries advised their citizens to leave the island. The *Harlan County* did not try a second attempt to dock in the harbour. The assassination on 14 October of Guy Malary, Minister of Justice in Aristide's government of national reconciliation, confirmed that the crisis in Haiti was growing.

B. Sanctions Reimposed

The U.S. called for the reimposition of sanctions on Haiti. The UN Security Council on 13 October voted to reimpose the oil and arms embargo at midnight on 18 October unless the Haitian military leaders indicated their willingness to comply with the Governors Island agreement. The Haitian military did not respond and so the sanctions went into effect, Canada reimposing its sanctions as specified by the Security Council.

A new element, however, was introduced when the U.S., which imposed its own sanctions as well as those of the UN, announced on 15 October that these would be enforced by U.S. navy ships off the coast of Haiti. On 16 October, Canada announced that two of its destroyers and an operational support ship, which were in the Gulf of Mexico on military exercises, would head for Haiti to help with enforcement. (These three ships were later replaced by only one.) The Canadian and U.S. ships were joined at one point by British, French and Dutch warships.

Despite the return of sanctions and the new enforcement measures, the Haitian military leaders showed little sign of surrendering their hold on power to let Aristide return. The UN special envoy sought the help of former government leaders like Brian Mulroney and Jimmy Carter to speed up negotiations. The deadline of 30 October came and went without the restoration of Aristide, and it was obvious that the stalemate that began after the September 1991 coup was continuing.

ANALYSIS OF STALEMATE

The Haitian situation is a classic example of the inability of international sanctions to produce, at least in the short term, the results desired by the international community. The use of sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1970s and against South Africa in the 1980s demonstrated that years can pass before sanctions finally persuade delinquent regimes to mend their ways. Iraq's refusal to withdraw its troops from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, despite the application and enforcement of sanctions, also suggests that sanctions are unlikely to be successful immediately. The South African and Rhodesian cases showed that other factors usually come into play - for example, the fear of civil war, the impact of a world recession on an economy already weakened by sanctions, or the loss of a sanctions-busting ally.

At first glance, a small and poor country like Haiti would appear to be much more vulnerable to sanctions than larger countries with considerable financial resources like South Africa, Rhodesia, and Iraq. The fact that it is part of an island also makes it relatively easier to choke the supply routes into the country and to limit sanctions-busting. On the other hand, a small and poor country with a struggling economy might not feel the effects of sanctions so dramatically.

Sanctions usually affect ordinary poor citizens long before they affect political leaders and their supporters. Of course, discontent within the population, fanned by sanctions, could lead to an uprising and thus indirectly prompt the regime to accept compromise. In Haiti, however, the military was so used to terrorizing the citizens that the likelihood of an uprising was not great. Moreover, the international community, anxious not to provoke a major bloodbath, exempted humanitarian aid and food from the sanctions.

The fact remains, however, that short of a military intervention, sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and the threat of military intervention were the only tools the international community could use in dealing with the Haitian military leaders. During the enforcement of sanctions, Canadian, U.S. and other vessels verified the contents of ships headed for Haiti and made them turn back if necessary. The situation became a siege where the international community hoped the military leaders would finally agree to restore democracy. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens suffered as a result of the restricted flow of goods and the crippling of the economy.

The Haitian crisis might have been solved more easily had it not been for the entrenched positions of both supporters and opponents of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Haitian military and business leaders are strongly opposed to Aristide's left-wing policy and what they view as his inflexibility. The OAS, the UN and the U.S. are just as resolved to restore Aristide, as well as democracy. A compromise agreement might perhaps have been easier if another person could have been president; however, for good reason, the international community insists on the return of Aristide, who was elected president with some 67% of the popular vote. It would be a contradiction for the international community to insist on democracy yet permit a duly elected official to be replaced with someone more to the liking of a certain portion of the population. In short, unless Aristide himself decided to allow someone else to take his position, the international community had little choice but to support him.

Aristide's policies and personality certainly have an impact on the international community's position on the issue. Some politicians and journalists in the U.S. and elsewhere have questioned the support for Aristide. In their view, his left-wing policies, influenced by liberation theology, and his personal behaviour should not be encouraged by the U.S. There have also been claims, notably in CIA reports, that Aristide is a manic depressive with homicidal

tendencies; however, other observers claim that these accusations are part of a smear campaign orchestrated by the Haitian military and their supporters.⁽³⁾ Indeed, some of the quotations in the CIA reports have been denied by those who were quoted.⁽⁴⁾

Although the Clinton Administration remains committed to the restoration in Haiti of both democracy and Aristide, the propaganda war over Aristide's policies and personality has caused some problems. The U.S. and the rest of the international community wanted to avoid the bloodshed and controversy that could result from military intervention in Haiti. As well, public support in the U.S. for U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations or for military intervention in world troublespots had declined in recent months because of events in Somalia. This, together with the controversy over Aristide's policies and health, made the Clinton administration even more reluctant to use force in this situation.

The use of warships to enforce sanctions reimposed following the collapse of the Governors Island agreement was a significant escalation, given the fact that similar measures had not been taken during the earlier period of sanctions. The Clinton administration and the UN hoped that it would not be necessary to go further to bring about the desired results. However, there were risks, no matter what decision was made.

RISKS OF ARMED INTERVENTION

Those in favour of intervention had certain issues to consider. While naval operations enforcing sanctions involved few risks, a military intervention in Haiti itself would present far more. A multinational force with a strong U.S. contingent would have little difficulty in overwhelming the Haitian military and taking key positions in the country; however,

(3) Time Weiner, "Critics Say CIA Swayed by Links with Aristide Foes," *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 2 November 1993, p. A10; see also Phil Davidson, "Aristide's Worst Enemy Is a Canadian," *Ottawa Citizen*, 2 November 1993, p. A1.

(4) For example, the Haitian doctor who allegedly treated Aristide lives in Montreal and denies the comments attributed to him. He states that Aristide was only one of his students, not a patient. See Gilles Toupin, "Le docteur Montplaisir dément avoir traité le père Aristide," *La Presse* (Montreal), 3 November 1993, p.B7.

a large number of civilians could be killed or injured, if only accidentally. The loss of life during the invasion of Panama provided a vivid example of what might happen, even if a military operation was focused only on a small area. Furthermore, bloodshed could well continue after the arrival of the multinational force if supporters of Haitian military leaders undertook guerrilla warfare in the hilly regions far from the coast.

It was thought that support for any such guerrilla fighting would be limited, however. Most of the population in Haiti did not support the military leaders and would likely welcome the multinational force, especially if military intervention came after many years of misery under sanctions. Even so, the supporters of the coup leaders could stage attacks on citizens or soldiers for months after the arrival of the multinational force, which might have to remain in Haiti for many months, if not years, to ensure the restoration of democracy and law and order. The international community wished to avoid this at a time when they were cutting their defence budgets and needed soldiers for other peacemaking operations.

Thus, the UN had to consider the effects of a possible military intervention on the lives of UN soldiers and Haitian civilians as well as on the international community's ability to undertake other peacemaking initiatives. It would be embarrassing for the UN, and the U.S. in particular, if there were considerable loss of life as a result of a military intervention or if Lieutenant-General Cédras and his supporters managed to escape capture. Whether warranted or not, public opinion in the U.S., Canada and Europe was becoming more cynical about the ability of the UN and, to some extent, the U.S., to ensure world peace. A messy military intervention in Haiti would generate even more criticism and might erode public support for international efforts to bring about peace and to ease human suffering in other world troublespots.

On the other hand, the international community realized it could find itself in an even more embarrassing position if it did not intervene and if, despite a complete embargo, the Haitian military was still able to defy the world for months. The Clinton Administration was anxious to avoid further damage to its credibility in foreign affairs, especially after the difficulties in bringing peace to Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Nor did it wish to exacerbate the Haitian refugee problem. Thus, it began to feel that it had no option but to intervene militarily with other UN countries, in spite of the risks involved.

The international community faced a great dilemma. The image of a small military clique defying the world was very embarrassing and there was a lot of pressure to use force to bring the crisis to a swift end. Such use of force, however, would raise expectations of military intervention in, for example, the former Yugoslavia, where the area to be controlled, the size of the population, and the military force available to the possible antagonists all presented much greater risks. Moreover, experience in Somalia had demonstrated that use of force offers no guarantee that peace or democracy will be easily restored. Thus the international community would have preferred diplomacy and sanctions to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis in Haiti.

SITUATION UP TO JULY 1994

Canada had long believed that military intervention in Haiti was something to be avoided if at all possible. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet, however, acknowledged that it could be the "ultimate recourse."⁽⁵⁾ While the impatience of the international community increased the possibility of military action, Canada did not want to become involved in the actual invasion. The Minister of National Defence, David Collenette, and other government officials indicated however, that Canada would be ready to contribute to a UN peacekeeping operation established after the restoration of democracy. André Ouellet suggested, for example, that members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police could help train the civilian police.⁽⁶⁾

By July 1994, the stalemate between the Cédras regime and the international community had reached a point where military action seemed almost inevitable. The evident gaps in the effectiveness of sanctions (especially the continued flow of gasoline from the Dominican Republic), the installation in May 1994 of an un-elected president (Emil Jonassaint), continued killings of pro-democracy Haitians by the Cédras regime, and the increasing flow of

(5) Allan Thompson, "Haiti Has Been Warned: Ouellet," *The Toronto Star*, 13 July 1994.

(6) Lise Lachance, "Collenette dit non à MIL Davie et à la fanfare du Royal 22^e régiment," *Le Soleil* (Québec), 15 July 1994; Michel C. Auger, "André Ouellet s'attend à ce qu'Aristide rentre chez lui," *Le Journal de Montréal*, 18 July 1994.

refugees desperate to leave the island were significantly testing the patience of the international community. The U.S. imposed new sanctions on the Haitian regime on 22 June 1994. These included the freezing of assets in U.S. banks of Haitians still in Haiti and a ban on international flights to that country. The expulsion of international human rights observers from Haiti in July and the continued defiance of the military regime helped to push the international community to the brink of military action.

On 31 July 1994, by a vote of 12 to 0 with two abstentions, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 authorizing a multinational force led by the U.S. to invade Haiti if sanctions failed to force the military regime to restore democracy. No deadline for action was set by the resolution, which called for the eventual replacement of any invading force by a peacekeeping force of some 6,000 soldiers which would maintain order and assist the creation of a civilian police force. In Haiti, the Cédras regime declared a state of siege and ordinary citizens began to flee to the countryside in anticipation of an invasion.

CARTER AGREEMENT OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1994

A. Uncertain Victory

By the middle of September, the invasion of Haiti by U.S. forces, in accordance with the UN resolution, was clearly imminent. In a last minute attempt to avoid a full-scale invasion, on 16 September, President Clinton sent a delegation (composed of former President Jimmy Carter, retired General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn), to meet with General Cédras in Haiti. On 18 September, barely an hour before the invasion was slated to start, an agreement was reached between the two sides permitting U.S. troops to arrive in Haiti without opposition from the Haitian military and police forces.

The mandate given to the U.S. delegation was basically to persuade General Cédras and other key members of the junta to leave Haiti; however, the Carter agreement allows General Cédras to remain in the country and leaves the army and police forces more or less in place. Under the agreements, the Haitian parliament is to pass a law by 15 October giving a general amnesty to the military and police forces. On 28 September, when the parliament held its first meeting, however, it was evident that many members were against such general amnesty and the adoption of such a measure was by no means certain.

The compromise agreement did succeed in avoiding a full-scale invasion, thereby significantly reducing the risks of casualties and making President Clinton's task easier. He had been having difficulty in convincing U.S. public opinion that U.S. involvement in the situation was necessary. The agreement also obtained General Cédras's commitment that he would leave power by 15 October and allow President Aristide to return, thus more or less accomplishing what the international community had been trying to do since 1991. However, the compromises added new complications to an already complex situation.

The agreement's call for close cooperation between the Haitian military and police forces and the U.S. military was put to the test on the day U.S. troops arrived in Port-au-Prince, when the Haitian police used brutal methods to disperse a crowd of civilians. The strong international reaction made the U.S. warn the Haitian police to change their methods; however, the use of unacceptable force by the Haitian military and police forces, even after the arrival of U.S. troops, did little to reassure President Aristide and his supporters. Indeed, Aristide was slow to welcome the announcement of the Carter agreement and apparently accepted it only after some persuasion by the Clinton Administration.

Unlike a full-scale invasion, which in all likelihood would have removed General Cédras decisively from power and disarmed the police and military forces, the Carter agreement creates an ambiguous situation. Aristide can return to power, but will still face considerable opposition from the elements of Haitian society that supported the military. Since Aristide's term ends at the end of 1995 and he cannot run for a second term, he will have little time in which to carry out reforms.

In short, although the Carter Agreement prevented significant loss of life, it leaves the balance of power in Haiti much as it was when the coup took place in 1991. Emboldened by the presence of U.S. soldiers, however, Aristide's supporters, who come mainly from the poor masses, have on several occasions confronted the military and police forces which had kept them at bay since the coup. The tensions between the two camps remain very high. U.S. troops can maintain order for some time, but the Carter agreement itself by no means guarantees political peace and stability in Haiti in the years to come.

B. Canada's Position

The present situation has significant implications for phase two, the peacekeeping segment, of the international community's intervention in Haiti. There was already some uncertainty as to when exactly the second phase would begin following a full-scale invasion; the Carter agreement and the peaceful invasion that followed intensified this uncertainty.

Canada nevertheless reaffirmed its commitment to the second phase of the operation. On 19 September 1994 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, André Ouellet, welcomed the Carter agreement, especially since a full-scale invasion had been avoided. He was confident that the presence of U.S. forces in Haiti would ensure the surrender of power by General Cédras and the return of President Aristide to Haiti. The minister indicated that Canada would then be ready to provide development aid for the educational, agricultural, and other sectors.

On 21 September, Mr. Ouellet confirmed that Canada would participate in phase two by sending about 600 soldiers, who would help maintain order after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and 100 RCMP officers, who would train a civilian police force. One week after the invasion, it was still not clear whether or not the Canadian peacekeeping contingent would arrive in Haiti before Aristide's return, but an advance team of 13 RCMP and four military officers was to prepare for the contingent's arrival.

The situation with which Canadian peacekeepers and RCMP officers will have to deal in Haiti is not necessarily so different from what they would have found following a full-scale invasion, although the continuing presence of the military and police forces that supported Cédras will certainly complicate matters. If tensions between Aristide's supporters and the right-wing continue to increase, the contingent's task will be even more complicated and the risks for Canadian personnel will be greater.

The Canadian contingent may have to remain in Haiti at least until the end of 1995, when the presidential elections are slated to take place, and the peacekeeping operation as whole may have to continue even beyond that time. Since Canada's diminishing military resources must already meet a number of peacekeeping commitments elsewhere in the world, the need for a very lengthy operation in Haiti could create problems. However, if Canada remains committed to peacekeeping and to the strengthening of Haiti's democracy and economy, its personnel will likely remain there for the duration of the UN mandate.

C. The Lifting of Sanctions

Despite the confusion surrounding the peacekeeping phase, the international community has acted quickly to help rebuild Haiti's economy. The Carter agreement made a commitment that international sanctions would be lifted as quickly as possible and, during a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September, President Clinton announced that the United States was lifting many of its unilateral restrictions, such as those on travel and on financial transactions by Haitians. Canada took similar action. On 29 September 1994, the Security Council of the UN voted to lift the multilateral sanctions.



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